Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference

One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, concentrating on the way perceptual reference links us with the observable world, and go on to examine the implications of theories of perceptual reference for realism and the way in which scientific theories refer and thus connect us with the world. They will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science and action theory.

1. Reference, perception, and realism Athanassios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer; 2. Towards an (improved) interdisciplinary investigation of demonstrative reference Amanda Brovold and Rick Grush; 3. Visual demonstratives Mohan Matthen; 4. Losing grip on the world: from illusion to sense-data Derek Brown; 5. Perceiving the intended model John Campbell; 6. Individuation, reference, and sortal terms Jonathan Lowe; 7. Action, perception, and reference Peter Machamer and Lisa Osbeck; 8. Personal and semantic reference Gerald Vision; 9. Reference from a behaviorist point of view Don Howard; 10. Causal-descriptivism and the reference of theoretical terms Stathis Psillos; 11. Scientific representation, denotation, and explanatory power Demetris Portides; 12. Referring to localized cognitive operations in parts of dynamically active brains William Bechtel.

Athanasios Raftopoulos is professor of Epistemology and Cognitive Science in the Department of Psychology at the University of Cyprus. He is the author of Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and the Neural Sciences Inform Philosophy (2009), editor of Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Planning, and Bottom-up Constraints (2005) and co-editor of Emergence and Transformation in the Mind: Modelling and Measuring Cognitive Change (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Peter Machamer is professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, Associate Director of Pittsburgh's Center for Philosophy of Science and a member of the Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition (CNBC). He is co-author, with J. E. McGuire, of Descartes' Changing Mind (2009). He is co-editor, with Gereon Wolters, of Interpretation (2010) and, with Michael Silberstein, of Blackwell's Guide to Philosophy of Science (2002).