International Water Treaties Negotiation and Cooperation Along Transboundary Rivers Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy Series
Auteur : Dinar Shlomi
As demand for fresh water rises, together with population, water scarcity already features on the national security agenda of many countries. In this book, Dinardevelops a theory to explain solutions to property rights conflicts over shared rivers. Through systematic analysis of available treaty texts, corresponding side-payment and cost-sharing patterns are gleaned. Geographic and economic variables are used to explain recurring property rights outcomes.
Rather than focusing on a specific river or particular geographic region, the book analyzes numerous rivers, dictated by the large number of treaty observations, and is able to test several hypotheses, devising general conclusions about the manner in which states resolve their water disputes. Policy implications are thereby also gained. While the book simultaneously considers conflict and cooperation along international rivers, it is the focus on negotiated agreements, and their embodied side-payment and cost-sharing regimes, that justifies the use of particular independent variables.
1. Introduction 2. Explaining Conflict, Cooperation and Agreements about International Rivers 3. Treaty Design and Property Rights: Theory and Hypotheses 4. Empirical Analysis of Treaty Design Differences: Through-border and Border-creator Configurations 5. Empirical Analysis of Treaty Design Differences: Other Configurations 6. Conclusion
Shlomi Dinar is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and Geography, Florida International University.
Date de parution : 06-2014
15.6x23.4 cm
Disponible chez l'éditeur (délai d'approvisionnement : 14 jours).
Prix indicatif 64,97 €
Ajouter au panierDate de parution : 12-2007
15.6x23.4 cm
Thèmes d’International Water Treaties :
Mots-clés :
Downstream State; upstream; Upstream State; state; International Water Law; downstream; Property Rights Conflicts; economic; Provide Side Payments; asymmetry; International River; property; Upstream Country; rights; Core Configurations; conflicts; River Agreement; law; Downstream Country; core; Geographical Configuration; Vice Versa; International Water Treaties; International Legal Principles; Compromise Principle; Economic Asymmetries; Ta Te; International Watercourses; River Riparians; Property Rights Solution; Property Rights Dispute; Hegemonic Stability Theory; Mekong River Agreement; Reasonable Utilization; Pe Ci