Anarchy Unbound Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society Series

In Anarchy Unbound, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance. Relying on experience from the past and present, Professor Leeson provides evidence of anarchy 'working' where it is least expected to do so and explains how this is possible. Provocatively, Leeson argues that in some cases anarchy may even outperform government as a system of social organization, and demonstrates where this may occur. Anarchy Unbound challenges the conventional self-governance wisdom. It showcases the incredible ingenuity of private individuals to secure social cooperation without government and how their surprising means of doing so can be superior to reliance on the state.

1. Anarchy unbound; Part I. Self-Governance and the Problem of Social Diversity: 2. Social distance and self-enforcing exchange; 3. The laws of lawlessness; Part II. Self-Governance and the Problem of Violence: 4. Trading with bandits; 5. Efficient plunder; Part III. Social-Governance and the Problem of 'Bad Apples': 6. Pirates' private order; 7. Criminal constitutions; Part IV. Self-Governance as Superior to the State: 8. Efficient anarchy; 9. Better off stateless; 10. An argument for anarchy in LDCs; 11. A future for thinking about self-governance.

Peter T. Leeson is a Professor of Economics and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University, Virginia. He is also the North American editor of Public Choice. Previously, he was a Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, the F. A. Hayek Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Visiting Fellow in Political Economy at Harvard University, Massachusetts. Professor Leeson is the author of The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (2009) and a recipient of the Fund for the Study of Spontaneous Order's Hayek Prize, which he received for his research on self-governance.