Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency Lessons From Post-Colonial Conflict Studies in Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and National Security Series

This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls.

The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago ? Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them ? remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today.

Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change.

Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

1. Introduction 2. Applying the Iron Fist in Chechnya and Sri Lanka 3. Twice Successful, Still Challenged: Insurgency in 21st-Century Southern Philippines 4. Counterinsurgency at Home: Perseverance in Northern Ireland 5 Counterinsurgency Lessons from a Civil War: Sierra Leone 6. Interdicting Insurgency: Applying a Comprehensive Approach in the Solomon Islands 7. Taking on Criminal Insurgency: Colombian Success against the FARC 8. The Operational Oil Spot and Rise of the Militias: COIN in Iraq’s Al Anbar Province 9. Further Contemplation on Revised Beliefs 10. Additional Recommendations and Concluding Thoughts

Russell W. Glenn is Senior Lecturer in military operations and national security studies at The Australian National University, Canberra. He has a PhD in American History from the University of Kansas.