Models of Imperfect Information in Politics
Langue : Anglais
Auteur : Calvert R.
Surveys the models of political phenomena that incorporate imperfect information, concentrating on 'full-rationality' approaches as opposed to bounded rationality models.
Models of Imperfect Information in Politics, Randall L. Calvert;
Postgraduate
Randall L Calvert
Date de parution : 12-2001
13.8x21.6 cm
Date de parution : 07-2015
13.8x21.6 cm
Thèmes de Models of Imperfect Information in Politics :
Mots-clés :
voter; ideal; points; probabilistic; voting; pareto; set; full; nash; equilibrium; Voter Ideal Points; Probabilistic Voting; Full Information Model; Imperfect Information; Nash Equilibrium; Perfect Information Model; Uninformed Voter; Pareto Set; Candidate Platforms; Candidate Equilibrium; Bounded Rationality Models; Pure Strategy Equilibrium; Voter Uncertainty; Candidate Uncertainty; Mixed Strategy Equilibrium; Mixed Strategies; Euclidean Preferences; CAL; Majority Rule Equilibrium; Smooth; Participation Game; Voter Learning; Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem; Voting Costs; Issue Space
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