A Political Theory Primer
Auteur : Ordeshook Peter C.
First published in 1992, A Political Theory Primer is designed as an introductory course for students in the application of game theory to modeling political processes. Examining those very phenomena that power political machineries--elections, legislative and committee processes, and international conflict--the book attempts to answer fundamental questions about their nature and function.
Included at the end of each chapter is a set of exercises designed to allow students to practice the construction and analysis of political models. Although the text assumes only training at the basic algebra level, the student who completes a course around this text will be equipped to read nearly all the professional literature that makes use of game-theoretic analysis. Each chapter also contains suggestiosn for further reading for those students who want to broaden their learning and expertise.
1. Representation of Political Processes 2. Analysis of Extensive Form Games 3. Analysis of Strategic Form Games 4. Some Special Political Games 5. Games with Incomplete Information 6. Cooperation and Coalitions
Peter C. Ordeshook is Professor of Political Science at California Institute of Technology.
Date de parution : 08-1992
15.2x22.9 cm
Date de parution : 04-2016
15.2x22.9 cm
Thème d’A Political Theory Primer :
Mots-clés :
Condorcet Winner; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; international conflict; Nash Equilibrium; elementary game-theoretic ideas; Median Voter Theorem; committee processes; Pure Strategy Equilibrium; political machineries-elections; Row Chooser; political theory primer; Pure Strategy; Strategic Form; Decision Node; Column Chooser; Voter Ideal Points; Ideal Points; Subgame Perfection; Mixed Equilibrium Strategy; Voting Tree; Centipede Game; Extensive Form; Mixed Strategy; Uninformed Voters; Winning Coalition; Strategic Equivalent; Bayesian Equilibrium; Evolutionary Stable Strategies; Bargaining Set; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria