The Economics of International Environmental Agreements Routledge Revivals Series
Coordonnateur : Batabyal Amitrajeet
This title was first published in 2000: Conflicts between developed and developing countries over global environmental problems, and the fact that the co-operation required to solve environmental collective action problems is typically elusive in the world of international relations, suggests a research agenda regarding how one might hop to bring about co-operation in an inherently non-co-operative international setting. In particular, what can economic theory tell us about the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that will protect the world's fragile environmental resources? This book collects work on IEAs which demonstrates the value of rigorous microeconomic and econometric modelling in comprehending the many and varied facets of the design and implementation in IEAs.
Date de parution : 12-2018
16.7x24.3 cm
Date de parution : 11-2017
16.7x24.3 cm
Mots-clés :
Marginal Abatement Costs; Nash Equilibria; Economics; Ontreal Protocol; Environmental Agreements; Noncooperative Equilibrium; IEA; Global Net Benefits; International; Abatement Levels; international relations; Side Payments; Self-enforcing IEA; Abatement Cost; Stable Coalition; Sulfur Emissions; West Germany; Environm Ental Problems; Montreal Protocol; Emission Cutbacks; World’s GDP; Iowa State University; Nash Bargaining Solution; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Target Deposition; Unilateral Emission Reductions; Liability Constraints; Incentive Compatibility Constraint; PPP