Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory Series
Auteur : Woodard Christopher
This book is about fundamental questions in normative ethics. It begins with the idea that we often respond to ethical theories according to how principled or pragmatic they are. It clarifies this contrast and then uses it to shed light on old debates in ethics, such as debates about the rival merits of consequentialist and deontological views. Using the idea that principled views seem most appealing in dilemmas of acquiescence, it goes on to develop a novel theory of pattern-based reasons. These are reasons to play one?s part in some larger pattern of action because of the goodness or rightness of that pattern. Existing accounts of pattern-based reasons usually assume that such reasons can exist only in cooperative contexts.
This book rejects that assumption, and claims instead that we can have pattern-based reasons even when the other agents involved in the pattern are wholly unwilling to cooperate. The result is a pluralist teleological structure for ethics, with similarities to some forms of Rule Consequentialism. Woodard claims that this structure achieves an attractive balance between the two virtues of being pragmatic and being principled.
One Pragmatism, Consequentialism, and Teleology
Two Acquiescence and Necessity
Three The Cooperative Conception
Four The Bare Idea of Pattern-Based Reasons
Five Rejecting the Willingness Requirement
Six Recklessness and Futility
Seven Conclusion
Notes
Glossary
Bibliography
Index
Christopher Woodard is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK.
Date de parution : 06-2012
Ouvrage de 168 p.
15.6x23.4 cm
Date de parution : 10-2007
15.6x23.4 cm
Thème de Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation :
Mots-clés :
Willingness Requirement; willingness; Act Teleology; requirement; Deontic Status; act; Cooperative Utilitarianism; teleology; Cooperative Conception; deontic; Rule Consequentialism; status; Act Consequentialism; cooperative; Rule Teleology; conception; Deliberative Stance; consequentialism; Teleological Theories; mere; Group Agency; Basic Constraint; Act Utilitarianism; Disjunctive Constraint; Mere Agglomerations; Dependency Thesis; Resolute Choice; Principled Considerations; Predictive Stance; Hooker Model; Impartial Good; Jim’s Choice; Identity Thesis; Group Failure; Diagonal Comparisons