Doing Phenomenology, Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1975 Essays on and in Phenomenology Phaenomenologica Series, Vol. 63

Substantial encouragement for this volume came from the editors and readers of the Studies for Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) at Northwestern University Press. But its publi­ cation has been made possible only by the unqualified and un­ abridged acceptance of the Editorial Board of Phaenomen%gica, which at the time was still headed by its founder, the late Professor H. L. Van Breda, who welcomed the manuscript most generously. This makes his untimely passing even more grievous to me. The stylistic copy editing and proof reading were handled ef­ ficiently by Ruth Nichols Jackson, secretary of the Philosophy Department. In the proof reading I also had the able help of my colleague Stanley Paulson. I dedicate this book to the memory of my late brother, Dr. chern. Erwin Spiegelberg, at the time of his death assistant professor at the University of Rio de Janeiro, who preceded me by two years in emigrating from Nazi Germany. When in 1938 he put an end to his life in an apparent depression, he also did so in order not to become a burden to his brothers, who were on the point of following him. Whatever I, more privileged in health and in opportunities in the country of my adoption, have been able to do and achieve since then has been done with a sense of a debt to him and of trying to live and work for him too.

One To The Things (Essays on Phenomenolology).- A. On the Meaning of Phenomenology.- 1. “Phenomenology”.- Origin and Development.- Characteristics.- 2. Ways into phenomenology: phenomenology and metaphenomenology.- I. The way through the texts.- II. The way through history.- 3. A new way into phenomenology: the workshop approach.- I. The original idea.- II. The realization.- III. The new methods.- IV. The uses and limitations of group phenomenology.- 4. Phenomenology through vicarious experience.- I. The problem and its background.- II. Karl Jaspers’ “phenomenology” of psychopathic phenomena.- III. Developments in psychopathology since Jaspers.- IV. The scope of the problem.- V. Husserl’s attempt to widen the scope of direct phenomenology.- VI. The idea of a phenomenology through vicarious experience.- 5. Existential uses of phenomenology.- I. Descriptive phenomenology.- II. Essential phenomenology (eidetic phenomenology).- III. Phenomenology of appearances.- IV. Constitutive phenomenology.- V. Reductive phenomenology.- VI. Hermeneutic phenomenology.- >B. On the Rights of Phenomenology.- 6. How subjective is phenomenology?.- 7. Phenomenology of direct evidence (self-evidence).- I. Phenomenology and the untrustworthiness of self-evidence.- II. On authentic self-evidence.- III. Self-evidence and necessity of thought.- IV. On inauthentic self-evidence.- V. A discussion of specific cases.- VI. Conclusion.- 8. Criteria in phenomenology.- A. Initial assumptions.- B. Theses.- 9. The Phenomenon of reality and reality.- I. The problem.- II. The phenomenon of reality.- III. The reality of the phenomena of reality.- IV. Husserl’s phenomenological reduction in its epistemological significance.- V. Differences among the phenomena of reality in their epistemological significance.- VI. Dubitability and dubiousness.- VII. Insufficient reasons for doubt: Descartes’ arguments.- VIII. Reality-criteria.- IX. Interim balance: The case for general realism.- X. The problem of the genesis of sense-perception inits epitemological significance.- XI. Dubious phenomena of reality in their epistemological significance.- XII. The idea of a critical phenomenological realism.- XIII. Critical phenomenological realism and general critical ealism proper.- XIV. Neo-critical realism and phenomenological critical realism.- Two At the Things (Essays in Phenomenology).- 10. Toward a phenomenology of experience.- I. The problem of denotation.- II. The record of phenomenology.- III. Some phenomenological findings about experience.- IV. The given and the found in experience.- V. Toward a phenomenology of the context of experience.- VI. On the metaphysical significance of a phenomenology of experience.- 11. A phenomenological analysis of approval.- I. Purpose.- II. First distinctions.- III. The intrinsic structure of acknowledging approval.- IV. Approval is not a belief.- V. Approval as an attitude and approval as an act.- VI. The act of approval.- VII. Approval as a referential (“intentional”) act.- VIII. The extrinsic structure of approval: its incompleteness and secondary nature.- IX. The grounds of approval and their cognition.- X. Types of approval.- XI. Conclusions.- XII. The evidence of etymology.- 12. “We”: A linguistic and phenomenological analysis.- A linguistic analysis of we-talk.- Toward a phenomenology of the we-consciousness.- Some conditions for the right to say “we”.- 13. The relevance of phenomenological philosophy for psychology.- I. The issue and its background.- II. On Husserl’s contributions to psychology.- III. The potential relevance of Husser’s phenomenology for psychology.- IV. Phenomenology and field theory: a chance for co-operation.- V. Concluding remarks.- 14. The idea of a phenomenological anthropology and Alexander Pfänder’s psychology of man.- I. Anthropology and philosophical anthropology.- II. The idea of a phenomenological anthropology.- III. Phenomenological anthropology thus far.- IV. Pfänder and the phenomenology of man.- 15. Change of perspectives: constitution of a Husserl image.- Pre-perspective from Heidelberg.- Close-up perspective from Freiburg.- Retroperspective from Munich.- Far-off retrospective from America.- Total perspective.- Index of names.- Index of subjects.